Rommel actually started having issues [url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tobruk]starting at Torbuk[/url], where the over-stretched supply-line forced the axis to make a series of costly hasty-assaults upon the British garrison from which they never really recovered their momentum.

He made a really good effort to go back to the offensive in 1942, and achieved success in terms of gains/losses even though these gains were inconsequential to the bigger picture of a protracted war starting in Russia, and an aborted invasion of England. The fact that he managed to rush a disproportionate amount of troops from the strategic reserve was a greater indication of Hitler's favoritism than juggling what little he had remaining under his belt. Having only 50 German tanks and 14 Italian out of what was initially over 100 tanks at the start of that year.

For 2nd El Alamien, he managed to get reinforced up to nearly 500 tanks, and he promptly lost 50 of them (and nearly 30% of his manpopwer) in the first 2 days of the September operation.

By November, he only had 20 tanks, no fuel save for what was already inside the tanks, and hardly any ammunition.

It is true, he was up against ridiculously larger forces, but the above doesn't really paint a picture of any more brilliance than parking your car in the way of a speeding locomotive, then buying a new car to replace it. Repeat until the dealership runs out of cars.

Also: Employing minefields. Never bothered to develop a way to [i]clear[/I] a minefield.